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UTAH CODE ANN. §30-1-4.5(2) (1998) DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE OPEN COURTS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
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hi her brief, appellee argues that the trial

Article 1. seeing [ ,
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<ovides as follows:

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injur) done to
luin in ins person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any
civil cause to which in- is .1 mm
i

courts clause, first asked the qucsiion whether the nature of the right at issue was "of a
typ e that its destruction * •• Dv addressed with reference to the open courts

provision."

Ruling on Plaintiffs and Defendant's Objections to Commissioner's

Recommendations dated January 28, 1998, at 12. (Addendum A, Brief of Appellant.)
The trial court noted that, in general, the rights protected by article 1, section 11, were
rights existing at common law at the time of statehood when the Utah Constitution
was adopted. The trial court found that there was no cause of action for common law
marriage at the time the Utah Constitution was adopted. Id. at 13.
The trial court cited Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah 1994), for the
proposition that: "Prior to 1987, Utah never recognized common law marriages;
indeed, such marriages were expressly prohibited." Id. at 793 (citations omitted). The
court said that, because no right to common law marriage existed at the time of the
adoption of the Utah Constitution, the open courts clause could not be violated by a
time limitation on the determination of common law marriage. Id.
In her brief, appellee points out that the Utah Supreme Court has broadened the
rights protected by article 1, section 11. In Day v. State Ex Rel. D. of Public Safety,
980 P.2d 1171 (Utah 1999), the court said: "First, the rights protected by Article 1,
section 11 are not defined by those causes of action that existed in 1896." Id. at 1183.
The court added: "The determination of whether a person who is injured in 'person,
property, or reputation' has been denied a remedy by due course of law should be
decided by reference to the general law of rights and remedies at the time that the
Legislature abrogates a remedy." Id. at 1184.
Notwithstanding the fact that the rights protected by article 1, section 11, are
not limited to those existing at the time of the adoption of the Utah Constitution, the
open courts clause applies by its terms to remedies for injury done to person, property,
or reputation. The "right" at issue here is not a right to recover for injury to person,
property, or reputation; rather, it is the right to have a common law marriage
recognized. By its own terms, the open courts clause does not apply to such a right.
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Moreover, by enacting subsection 2 of section 30-1-4.5, the Utah Legislature
did not abrogate an existing right. As the trial court noted, there was no right to have
a common law marriage adjudicated prior to the passage of section 30-1-4.5. The
legislature created the right to have a common law marriage recognized and imposed a
time limitation on that right at the same time in the same statute. Since the legislature
was creating a new right, nothing in the open courts clause prohibits the legislature
from imposing a time limitation on the adjudication of the right.
All of the cases that appellee relies on deal with the abrogation of previously
existing rights. For example, Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah App. 1993),
involved the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. As the court noted, the writ
of habeas corpus occupies an "essential niche in the Anglo-American common law
and is the only common law writ that received explicit protection in the United States
and Utah Constitutions." 862 P.2d at 1376 (citations omitted) (concurring opinion of
Judge Orme). The availability of the writ, the court said, "provides 'one of the most
important of all judicial tools for the protection of individual liberty.'" Id. As the
court said in Currier, the nature of the individual right impacted by a statute
influences the level of scrutiny which a court should employ in examining that
legislation. Generally, "a court will exercise stricter scrutiny in evaluating measures
that encroach upon civil liberties than it will with respect to statutes that impact what
can be characterized as only economic interests."

862 P.2d at 1364 (citations

omitted).
The right, if one exists, to have a common law marriage established is not
found in the United States or the Utah Constitution, nor was it a part of the common
law in Utah before 1987. Thus, the limitation of the time for adjudication of common
law marriage imposed by the legislature when it created that right does not deserve
strict scrutiny.
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On the other hand, in Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999
UT 18, 974 P.2d 1194, the court held that the builders statute of repose did not violate
article 1, section 11, although, in some circumstances, it cut off entirely the right to
recover for certain injuries. The court applied the two-part test set forth in Berry v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 1X1 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985):
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured person an
effective and reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of law" for
vindication of his constitutional interest. The benefit provided by the
substitute must be substantially equal in value or other benefit to the
remedy abrogated in providing essentially comparable substantive
protection to one's person, property, or reputation, although the form of
the substitute remedy may be different.. . .
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided,
abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may be justified only if
there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the
elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or
unreasonable means for achieving the objective.
974 P.2d at 1198 (citation omitted).
By enacting the common law marriage statute, the legislature did not take away
a previously existing right by imposing the one-year requirement. The legislature
created the one-year requirement at the same time it created the right to have a
common law marriage. Thus, the strict scrutiny requirements of the open courts
clause do not apply.
Subsection 2 of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 does not violate the open courts
clause of the Utah Constitution.
n.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN IN RE
MARRIAGE OF GONZALEZ, 2000 UT 28, 385 UTAH ADV.
REP. 89, DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE.

On January 28, 2000, the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in In re
Marriage of Juanita Gonzales v. Martin Briceno, 2000 UT 28, 385 UTAH ADV.
REP. 89. In that case, the court dealt with the interpretation of the one-year limitation
4

period set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1998). Gonzales had filed a petition
for adjudication of marriage. Gonzales and Briceno had lived together, and Briceno
had set fire to Gonzales' home. Briceno had insurance through Metropolitan Property
and Casualty Insurance Company. If Gonzales were Briceno's spouse at the time of
the fire, she would have a claim under the Metropolitan policy. Metropolitan was
allowed to intervene in the action.
The relationship between Gonzales and Briceno had terminated on October 21,
1995. On April 10, 1997, Metropolitan moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that Gonzales had not obtained a judgment adjudicating her marriage within one year
of its termination as required by Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2). The trial court
granted Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment based on Gonzales' failure to
comply with the statutory time limit.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether subsection two of
section 30-1-4.5 should be interpreted to require an adjudication of marriage within
one year, or only the filing of a petition for adjudication of marriage within one year.
The court concluded that subsection required only the filing of a petition for
adjudication of marriage. Although the parties had raised constitutional issues, the
court did not reach those issues, based on its interpretation of the statute.
In Gonzales, Metropolitan had argued that Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918
(Utah App. 1995), required that a petition for adjudication of marriage be brought and
decided within one year of the relationship's termination. In Bunch, the parties had
separated in August of 1990. In May of 1991, Bunch filed a divorce complaint
against Englehorn. The trial court dismissed the complaint in June of 1993, on the
grounds that no order was obtained establishing the marriage within the required time
limit of one year. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the order establishing
the marriage must be obtained within one year of the termination of the relationship.
In Gonzales, the Supreme Court distinguished Bunch: "We agree with Ms. Gonzales
5

that her case is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as it involves a petition to establish a
marriage, not to obtain a divorce." In re Marriage of Gonzales, 387 UTAH ADV. REP.
at 95, fh. 7.
In this case, appellee did not file a petition for adjudication of marriage.
Rather, in July of 1996, appellee filed a pleading entitled "Divorce Complaint." That
complaint alleged in the alternative that the original decree of divorce entered in July
of 1994 had been fraudulently obtained, or that the parties were man and wife
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5. R. at 126, ^ 3, and 127, U 5.
Because this action was founded on a divorce complaint, rather than a petition
for adjudication of marriage, it is distinguishable based on the language of footnote 7.
Gonzales does not require that the trial court's decision be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Subsection 2 of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1998) does not violate the open
courts clause of the Utah Constitution, because it does not abrogate an existing right,
nor does it modify or impinge upon a constitutionally guaranteed right.
The court's holding in In re Marriage of Gonzales, 387 UTAH ADV. REP. 89,
does not apply in this case, because this case does not involve a petition for
adjudication of marriage.
This case should be reversed and remanded to the trial court.
DATED this lA

day of February, 2000.
Respectfully submitted,
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
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